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JURISDICTION
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's ruling on a Motion for Award
of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses denying an award of attorneys' fees and expenses
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
Appellate jurisdiction is present pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j),
and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the District Court err in ruling that Provo City did not abandon the
proceedings when it failed to take any action on this case for more than two years, that
Provo City did not cause the action to be dismissed because Provo City did not
voluntarily move to dismiss the action, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, and
that just compensation in Utah does not encompass reimbursement of expenses, costs,
and attorneys' fees?
The standard of review for statutory interpretation is one of correctness.
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review for correctness, granting
no deference to the trial court's determinations." Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah App. 1996). See also Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d
658, 661 (Utah 1997); Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE WHOSE
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
This appeal involves the interpretation of the scope of Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution, and § 78-34-16 of the Utah Code.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Provo City filed its complaint in this matter on June 12, 2002 seeking to condemn
a portion of the Appellants' property for a road. (Record 35) Provo City subsequently
filed an amended complaint on September 5, 2002. (Record 209) Appellants, in their
answers, disputed the right of Provo City to condemn their property, which lies outside
the boundaries of Provo City in an unincorporated island of Utah County. Provo City
moved for immediate occupancy and a hearing on the motion went forward on November
2, 2002 before Judge Anthony Schofield. The trial court granted the City's Motion for
Immediate Occupancy but stayed enforcement for a period of 20 days to allow the
Appellants to file a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. (Record 336)
Appellants filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal (Record 338) and the Utah
Supreme Court granted permission for interlocutory appeal (Record 343) and stayed the
proceedings pending the appeal (Record 342). After briefing and argument by the
parties, the Supreme Court ruled on April 20, 2004, holding that Provo City had not
established its right to condemn the Appellants' property outside its corporate limits.
Provo City v. Ivie, 2004 UT 30, 94 P.3d 206.
While the case was on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Provo City entered into
an agreement with Utah County whereby Utah County agreed to condemn the
Appellants' property to provide for Provo City's road. (Record 395) Pursuant to the
Utah Supreme Court's decision that Provo City could not condemn the Appellants'
property, the Appellants made a demand upon Provo City on May 4, 2004 for
reimbursement of Appellants' expenses and attorney's fees. Provo City failed to respond.
-2-

Consequently, on May 25, 2004, Appellants filed a Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. On September 29, 2004, the Fourth District Court ruled
that a motion for attorneys' fees was premature because the case had not yet been
dismissed.
On June 10, 2004, in accordance with its agreement with Provo City, Utah County
brought a condemnation proceeding against the Appellants on the same property. On
September 13, 2004, Judge James Taylor heard Utah County's Motion for Immediate
Occupancy and granted immediate occupancy to the County for purposes of building the
road, but again stayed the order for 20 days to allow Appellants to file a Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal. Upon filing that petition, the Utah Court of Appeals granted leave
to appeal and a stay pending appeal. The matter was briefed and heard by the Utah
Supreme Court.
On May 26, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that Utah County could condemn
the Appellants' property for the road. Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 38, 137 P.3d 797.
Utah County and the Appellants are currently litigating that condemnation proceeding
before Judge James Taylor as Civil No. 040401797.
On July 18, 2006, the Appellants filed their Motion to Dismiss the original Provo
City condemnation case as being moot and for failure to prosecute. (Record 497) From
November 2002, when the District Court granted the Order of Immediate Occupancy,
until July 25, 2006, when Provo City filed a Motion to Consolidate (Record 582) in
response to Appellants' Motion to Dismiss this action, Provo City did nothing to
prosecute this matter. Provo City failed to file any motions, conduct discovery, make
requests for action, correspond with Appellants concerning the Provo City condemnation
-3-

action, or take any action to pursue the matter to conclusion. On October 2, 2006, the
District Court denied the Motion to Consolidate, and granted the Appellants' Motion to
Dismiss this case. (Record 743)
Once the case was dismissed, on December 14, 2006 Appellants filed a Motion for
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. (Record 781) Provo City opposed the motion
but did not object to the amount of Appellants attorneys' fees, and only disputed whether
Appellants are entitled to the attorneys' fees or not.

On April 25, 2007, the Fourth

District Court denied Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees, stating that the statutory
conditions had not been met. (Record 842) Appellants filed this timely appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-16 (copy attached as Exhibit "1") provides that a

condemnee is entitled to reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees in a
condemnation action if two conditions are fulfilled.

The condemning authority must

have abandoned the proceedings and must have caused the action to be dismissed. In the
present case Provo City abandoned the proceedings because, after the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that Provo City lacked the authority to condemn Appellants' land, Provo City
took no action on this case for more than two years, and has not taken any affirmative
action on the case since the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in 2004. Provo City caused the
action to be dismissed because Provo City utilized delay tactics that ultimately resulted in
the dismissal of the case. Because Provo City has both abandoned the proceedings and
caused the action to be dismissed, Appellants are entitled to reimbursement of expenses,
costs, and attorneys' fees. Furthermore, just compensation under the Utah Constitution is
broader in scope and in protection of rights than the corresponding protections provided
-4-

by the Federal Constitution. Just as Colorado and Florida have held, and, as an issue of
fairness and justice, just compensation in Utah should include the reimbursement of the
expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred in defending one's property.
ARGUMENT
I.

AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, PROVO CITY HAS
ABANDONED THE PROCEEDINGS, AND HAS CAUSED THE
ACTION TO BE DISMISSED, THEREBY IMPOSING UPON
THEMSELVES THE DUTY OF REIMBURSING APPELLANTS FOR
THEIR EXPENSES, COSTS AND ATTORNEYS9 FEES.

In this case, Appellee Provo City wrongfully sought to take, through eminent domain,
property outside city borders—property which Provo City did not have the legal authority
to condemn. Provo City v. Me, 2004 UT 30, 94 P.3d 206. In doing so, Provo City
forced Appellants to vigorously defend their property. In order to defend against Provo
City's extraterritorial condemnation, Appellants were required to employ counsel and
proceed through the judicial process, including appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Provo
City has imposed on Appellants the necessity of incurring substantial legal costs simply
in order to protect and maintain their property from the attacks of an illegal condemnation
action. (Affidavit of Kaye J. Ivie, Record 783, Affidavit of M. Dayle Jeffs, Record 799)
As was eventually shown by the result in Provo City v. Me, Appellants were justified in
this vigorous defense. "Every land owner in this country has a right to resist with every
legal means available the expropriation of his or her land. The right of eminent domain
does not require docile passivity on the part of a land owner."

Utah State Road

Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 834 (Utah 1984). After the Supreme Court's
decision in Provo City v. Ivie, the present case had no further prospects of success, and
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Provo City abandoned the action. The case was subsequently dismissed, and Appellants
moved for attorneys' fees in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
In 1967 the Utah State Legislature addressed the issue of the burdens placed on
landowners through condemnation actions by amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
The amendment is found in the last half of the section, which reads in pertinent part:
Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, at any
time prior to final payment of compensation and damages
awarded the defendant by the court or jury, abandon the
proceedings and cause the action to be dismissed without
prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal
condemner first compensate condemnee for all damages he
has sustained and also reimburse him in full for all reasonable
and necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee
because of the filing of the action by condemner, including
attorney fees. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
As will be explained further below, the facts of this case have revealed substantial
ambiguities in this statute, which require inquiry into the meaning of the words used and
the intent of the Legislature when the statute was drafted. The statute lays down two
requirements for a condemnee to gain entitlement to the costs, expenses and attorney fees
incurred in defending the action. The condemnor must "abandon the proceedings," and
must "cause the action to be dismissed."
A. Provo City abandoned the proceedings.
Provo City abandoned these proceedings when its defense of the appeal failed and
when it took no further action in this matter for over two years. Nowhere in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-34-16 is the term 'abandon' defined. "When interpreting statutes, our primary
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. The first step of statutory
interpretation is to evaluate the "best evidence" of legislative intent, namely, the plain
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language of the statute itself. When examining the statutory language we assume the
legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning."
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, t 13, 160 P.3d 1041 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Webster's Dictionary defines abandon as "to renounce and forsake .. .
to desert as lost or desperate." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 2
(2d ed. 1978). Black's Law Dictionary defines abandonment as "[t]he surrender,
relinquishment, disclaimer, or cessation of property or of rights."

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 2 (6th ed. 1990). See also Knox County v. Union Livestock Yard, Inc., 59
S.W.3d 158 (Tenn App. 2001). During a more than two year period following the Utah
Supreme Court's ruling against it, Provo City failed to do anything with regard to this
case.

Despite this inaction, Provo City has taken the position that they have not

abandoned the case because Utah County is pursuing condemnation of the same land.
In Provo City v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972) (copy attached as
Exhibit "2"), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether to impose costs and attorneys'
fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. The present case has striking parallels to
Cropper, in which the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the same statute
in very similar circumstances. The statute has remained unchanged since it was enacted
in 1967. In Cropper, Provo City sought to condemn land owned by Cropper for use as a
public park. Id. at 629. The action was filed, discovery conducted, and trial set for June
29, 1971. Id. Five days before the trial, Provo City notified Cropper and the trial court
that it had elected to not proceed further with the action because of the high appraisal
value given to the property. Id. The court struck the trial from its calendar. Id. After
negotiations regarding reimbursement of fees broke down, the trial court conducted a
-7-

hearing on the matter, dismissed the case and awarded Cropper his costs and attorney's
fees. Id. Provo City opposed the dismissal (i.e. the dismissal was not voluntary) and the
award. Id. at 629-30. In analyzing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, the Court stated,
It would appear that the provisions of the amendment as set
forth above were intended by the legislature to deal with the
practice of condemnors initiating proceedings to acquire
private property for public use and imposing upon the owners
the burdens of a trial or the preparation for a trial and then
abandoning the proceedings, when it appeared that the price
was too high, or for some other reason the condemnor elected
not to proceed further. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
Provo City argued that because they had opposed the dismissal of the case, and
had not acted voluntarily to dismiss the case, that they had not abandoned the
proceedings nor had they caused the action to be dismissed. Id. Therefore, Provo City
argued, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 was inapplicable and no attorneys' fees should be
awarded. Id. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument and chided Provo City,
stating,
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff should not be
permitted to represent to the court that this action was to be
abandoned and dismissed for purpose of avoiding a trial and
thereafter to contend that the action is still pending for the
purpose of avoiding payment of expenses and attorney's fees.
Id.
The Court also provided insight into the intent and underlying policy of the statute. "It is
our view that the statute was designed to correct a problem of unfairness in casting a
burden upon the owners of private property in this type of proceeding." Id. (emphasis
added).
In the present case, as in Cropper, Provo City attempted to resist the dismissal of
this case and the payment of attorney's fees on the basis that they did not abandon the
-8-

case and that they did not voluntarily dismiss the case. However, the facts clearly
indicate that Provo City has abandoned the proceedings. Furthermore, as is made clear
by Cropper, 'voluntary' dismissal is not required by the statute.1 As stated by the Utah
Supreme Court in its Utah County v. Ivie decision, Provo City v. Ivie held "that Provo
City lacked authority to condemn the property." Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33, ]|4
note 1, 137 P.3d 797. After this decision, Provo City failed to make any affirmative
effort to pursue this case. Even before the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Provo City
v. Ivie, Provo City, recognizing its weak legal position, entered into an Inter-local
Cooperation Agreement with Utah County, for Utah County to condemn Appellant's
Property using funds provided by Provo City. Soon after the decision in Provo City v.
Ivie was handed down, Utah County commenced its own separate condemnation action
for the same land. Provo City facilitated and funded the condemnation of the property by
Utah County in that separate proceeding. Appellants have again been required to incur
substantial expenses to defend against Utah County's condemnation.

Conspicuously,

Provo City was and is not a party to that action. In cooperating with Utah County, and no
longer pursuing its own case, Provo City ceased all efforts on the Provo City v. Ivie case,
and abandoned those proceedings.
As it did in Cropper, Provo City in this case has again tried to avoid its
responsibility to pay Appellants' the attorneys' fees and expenses by the tactic of not
dismissing the case of its own volition, but rather allowing the case to languish in limbo
while Provo City elected to go a different route. The fact that Provo City made no
attempt to file a Motion to Dismiss, but rather placed the burden on the Appellants to get
1

This issue will be explored under a separate sub-heading below.
-9-

the case dismissed, demonstrates the same kind of tactics for which Provo City was
chided by the Utah Supreme Court in Cropper. Provo City's attempt to avoid the
responsibilities is underscored by its attempt to consolidate this case with the Utah
County case in response to Appellants' Motion to Dismiss.

This attempt was

appropriately denied. In moving to consolidate the cases, Provo City was attempting to
avoid the responsibilities and unfairness that it visited upon Appellants through its invalid
condemnation actions in this case—unfairness, which the Cropper Court expressly
indicated that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 was intended to prevent.
The ruling by the Utah Supreme Court that Provo City could not condemn is even
more forceful than an elective abandonment and fits squarely within the "some other
reason" described by the Court in Cropper. 497 P.2d at 630. Because Provo City has no
right to condemn Appellants' property, Provo City has "elected not to proceed further"
the same as in Cropper. The unfairness in this matter is magnified because Provo City
attempted to condemn property outside it corporate boundaries and which it reasonably
should have known it had no jurisdiction. In keeping with the declared policy of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-16, that the statute is designed to prevent unfairness, Provo City

should be held responsible for Appellants' attorney's fees, expenses and costs caused by
its improper and failed condemnation action. Any other result would directly contradict
the statute's purpose, which, as is laid down in Cropper, is to compensate the condemnee
for the burden imposed by the condemnation action, and unfairness would result.
Other states, adhering to the same policy of preventing unfairness, have enacted
similar statutes awarding attorney's fees, expenses and costs in circumstances of
abandonment. In Platte River Power Authority v. Nelson, the Colorado Court of Appeals,
-10-

while interpreting Colorado's statute, noted that "a property owner should not be required
to incur costs when the condemning authority does not proceed properly." 775 P.2d 82,
83 (Colo. App. 1989). The court went on further to say that condemnation statutes
should be strictly construed against the government and liberally construed in favor of
property owners, with the policy against unfairness to the landowners in mind. Id. The
Utah Supreme Court has laid down similar policies in both Cropper and in Bertagnoli v.
Baker. 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950). The unfairness of imposing upon the property
owners the costs and fees associated with resisting the expropriation of their property is
exactly what the Utah State Legislature intended to remedy with the amendment of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-16.

Provo City's unauthorized condemnation action forced the Appellants to incur
legal expenses, of more than $47,761.50 in successfully defending against Provo City's
actions.2 The affidavit of the undersigned shows the details of the attorneys' fees which
have been incurred by the Appellants in defending this suit.3 (Record 799) In addition,
Appellants incurred expenses of hiring appraisers to begin an analysis of the effect of the
improper and failed condemnation in the amount of $5,830.00. (Record 783) Said fees
for appraisers were minimized by stopping the completion of their work when the
Supreme Court granted the interlocutory appeal.
The failure of Provo City to do anything affirmative regarding this case (resisting
the appeal and moving to consolidate were reactionary at best) demonstrates an
2

Appellants also seek the fees and expenses incurred in seeking this appeal, in an amount
to be determined by the trial court.
3
It is noteworthy that Provo City has not disputed the amount of attorney's fees, expenses
or costs, but only whether they are due or not.
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abandonment of the proceedings. Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term,
Provo City has clearly 'deserted,' 'forsaken,' 'disclaimed,' 'relinquished,' and abandoned
its claims in Provo City v. Ivie, the case now before the court.
B.

Provo City caused the action to be dismissed.

After the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decision in Provo City v. Ivie,
Provo City failed to take any action on the case for two years, and presumably, if
Appellants had not made a motion for attorneys' fees, would have been content to let the
case remain unresolved indefinitely.

Provo City, in its motions in the lower court,

attempted to characterize the requirement of causing the action to be dismissed in terms
of a voluntary versus an involuntary dismissal. (Record 435) Such an interpretation of
the statute creates perverse incentives for condemning authorities which is not in keeping
with the intention or the policy of the statute, and creates an absurd result.
Under Provo City's reading of the statute, unless a condemning authority
voluntarily causes the action to be dismissed, the statute does not apply. Under such a
scenario, a condemning authority would be acting against its own pecuniary interest if,
after deciding not to pursue a condemnation proceeding, or, as in this case, after being
unable to legally pursue a condemnation proceeding, the condemning authority moved to
dismiss its own action. Under Provo City's interpretation, only such a voluntary action,
in contradiction of the City's own financial interests, would activate the statute and create
a duty to reimburse the condemnee for their attorney's fees. Of course, with the option of
doing nothing and avoiding liability, rather than making a legal motion against its
interests, no condemning authority would ever seek to dismiss its own unsuccessful
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condemnation proceeding.

Such an interpretation is absurd, and contrary to the

underlying policy against unfairness to landowners, as articulated in Cropper.
It is an established legal principal that when the result of an interpretation of a
statute defeats legislative intent and leads to incongruous results, a court is obligated not
to pursue such an interpretation. Hypertechnical interpretations of statutes which do not
fulfill their plainly stated purposes are not appropriate. Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972,
974 (Utah 1965). "[W]e are cognizant of the fact that we are not following the literal
wording of the statute, but such is not required when to do so would defeat legislative
intent and make the statute absurd." Johansen et ux. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98,
108 (Utah 1944). See also Robinson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 261 P. 9, 12 (Utah 1927).
"Allowance should be made for the fact that statutes are not
necessarily stated in general terms, and that often there is
neither the prescience to foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of
language to cover with exactitude, all of the exigencies of life
which may arise. For this reason one of the fundamental
rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it
was intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and
applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give the
statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose,
reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically
applied literalness."
Andrus, 404 P.2d at 974 (Utah 1965) (internal citations omitted). See also State Land
Board v. State Department of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1965); Rio
Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 445 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1968).
"The duty of this court in construing and interpreting
legislative acts is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.
In the exposition of a statute the intention of the law-maker
will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; and its reason
and intention will prevail over the strict letter. When the
words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the
-13-

context; from the occasion and necessity of law; from the
mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with
reason and good discretion." "We may then look to the reason
of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and
give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose,
sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the
purpose may not fail. When the intention of the legislature
can be gathered from the statute, words may be modified,
altered, or supplied to give to the enactment the force and
effect which the legislature intended."
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 97 P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah 1940) (citations omitted).
Provo City's interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is inconsistent with
the underlying policy against unfairness, causes absurd results, and at best, is
hypertechnical and creates perverse incentives for municipalities to never fully conclude
an unsuccessful condemnation action.

By adding a voluntary requirement to the

language of the statute, Provo City would strip the statute of any practical power. Under
a 'voluntary' interpretation, no condemnee would ever receive reimbursement of
attorney's fees after a municipality abandons its case, because no municipality would
voluntarily seek dismissal. The Utah Legislature, in amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 7834-16, could not have intended the statute to have no practical effect.
Furthermore, Cropper specifically rejects this interpretation.

In Cropper after

Provo City had represented at hearing that they were going to dismiss the case, the City
subsequently refused to do so. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d at 1-3, 497 P.2d at 629-30. On
appeal the court noted that "the action was not dismissed voluntarily" and yet the
Cropper Court applied UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 regardless. Id. at 630. There is no
voluntary dismissal requirement in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
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In its Ruling on this issue, the Fourth District Court held that the statute creates an
'anomaly/ in which a landowner can receive reimbursement of attorneys' fees if the
condemning authority decides to voluntarily dismiss the case, or under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 17A-4-11034, the condemning authority offers compensation lower than the amount
actually awarded at trial, but in no other cases. The District Court recognized the
perverse incentives created by Provo City's interpretation of the statute, but accepts them
anyway, holding that the statute countenances this "anomaly and danger." (Record 842)
However, this result is obtained only if the Court accepts Provo City's illogical
conclusion that the statute includes a voluntary dismissal requirement. This "anomaly
and danger" might better be termed unfairness; the exact type of unfairness sought to be
countered by the statute. Holding that the statute countenances "anomaly and danger" is
the same as stating that the statute undermines its own policy, to prevent unfairness.
Such an interpretation is illogical and cannot be reasonably accepted.
Appellants advocate a more reasonable interpretation of the statute which would
not insert the word 'voluntary' into the statute, but rather would apply the phrase "cause
the action to be dismissed" to both voluntary and involuntary causation.

In such a

situation, the condemning authority can cause the proceeding to be dismissed by its own
action, or as in this case, its own inaction. In the present case, Provo City let this case
languish for more than two years before Appellants were forced to take some action to
resolve the issue. Appellants first moved for attorneys' fees directly, but the lower court
held that the case was not ripe for such a motion and that it must first be dismissed.
4

Although UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-4-1103 has since been repealed, the statute was in
effect at the time this action was filed, and both its provisions and its underlying policy
considerations apply to this case.
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Faced with the quandary of inaction on the part of Provo City, Appellants were forced to
move for dismissal themselves, and the case was subsequently dismissed. Having forced
Appellants to move for dismissal themselves, Provo City now argues that the language of
the statute precludes any reimbursement of fees. Such tactics should not be encouraged
by an incongruous interpretation of the statute. The statute can reasonably be interpreted
to mean both voluntary and involuntary causation. Such an interpretation is consistent
with the language of the statute, is in keeping with the underlying policy to prevent
unfairness, and does not gut the statute of any practical application or power.
By not taking any action on this case for over two years, Provo City abandoned the
proceedings, and, through these prolonged delay tactics, thereby forcing Appellants to
move for dismissal, Provo City caused the action to be dismissed within the meaning of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-16. Appellants are therefore entitled to attorneys' fees,

expenses, and costs.
II.

JUST COMPENSATION, AS USED IN THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE REIMBURSEMENT OF
EXPENSES, COSTS, AND ATTORNEYS' FEES.

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." While interpreting the
corresponding clause of the Federal Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated
that normally, "attorneys' fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation"
and that "such compensation is a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional
command." U.S. v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (1979). However, this same principle
does not automatically apply to the corresponding state constitutional provisions.
Colorado's Supreme Court has held that "to require the owner of property involved in
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condemnation proceedings to carry the burden of costs would not be 'just' within the
meaning of the constitutional guaranty." Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of Co.
Corn'rs, 98 P.2d283, 287 (Colo. 1940). Florida has reached a similar conclusion. Dade
County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950). This Court favorably recognized this
position in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah
App. 1989). In reviewing Florida's approach, this Court held that an interpretation of just
compensation which includes a reimbursement of attorneys' fees "appeals to a sense of
fairness." Id. at 1122-23. Because an interpretation of the Utah Constitution was not
present in Daskalas, this Court was limited to interpretations under the Federal
Constitution, which clearly do not permit attorneys' fees reimbursement, and therefore
did not address the issue under the Utah Constitution.
Although the Federal Constitution does not permit an award of attorneys' fees as
part of a right to just compensation, similar to both the Colorado and the Florida
Constitutions, the Utah Constitution can and should. The Utah Supreme Court has
repeatedly indicated that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is broader in its
scope and in the protections it affords. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah
1995). "Indeed, article I, section 22 protects all property protected by its federal
counterpart, and perhaps even more so due to its more expansive language." Strawberry
Elec. Service Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996); See also
Bagford, 904 P.2d at 1097.
Furthermore, as outlined above, including attorneys' fees within the rights
associated with just compensation "appeals to a sense of fairness." Compensation which
does not place a person in as good a pecuniary position as before the condemnation
-17-

occurred, and which does not made the person whole, is not 'just.' The Appellants have
expended a substantial amount of resources in seeking to protect their property from
expropriation by Provo City, and with regards to Provo City, these efforts have been
successful. Yet Appellants will have lost these resources and will have been in no way
made whole, nor will they have been placed in as good a pecuniary position as they were
before the condemnation was commenced, unless just compensation is interpreted to
include the costs, expenses, and fees associated with defending ones property from
attack. Appellants have lost valuable resources, and should be justly compensated. In
addition, a unilateral loss of pecuniary interest without any compensation cannot be
termed 'just' unless 'just' is ascribed a technical meaning, disassociated with the ordinary
meaning of the term, and different from its generally understood meaning at the time the
Utah Constitution was adopted. Such an interpretation is, at best, strained. Similar to
Colorado and Florida, just compensation under the Utah Constitution can and should
include compensation for expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees.
In addition to the expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees set forth in the affidavits
submitted to the trial court (Affidavit of Kaye J. Ivie, Record 783, Affidavit of M. Dayle
Jeffs, Record 799), this court should award Appellants the attorneys' fees incurred in
bringing this appeal.
CONCLUSION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-16 provides that a condemnee is entitled to

reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees in a condemnation action if the
condemning authority has abandoned the proceedings and has caused the action to be
dismissed. By failing to take any action on this case for more than two years Provo City
-18-

abandoned the proceedings. By using delay tactics and by forcing the case into an
involuntary dismissal, Provo City has caused the action to be dismissed. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-34-16 does not contain a voluntary dismissal requirement, because such a
requirement would gut the statute of any practical meaning, and because it would
contradict the statute's underlying policy of preventing unfairness. Finally, regardless of
the statute, the Utah Constitution is broader in its scope and protections than the Federal
Constitution.

As both Colorado and Florida have done, Utah should interpret just

compensation to include a right to reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees
in condemnation cases.
DATED and SIGNED this ?y

-flay of November, 2007.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
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on notice, and to charge him with duty to inquire further to ascertain the facts. U.C.A.1953,
78-34-15. Salt Lake, G. & W. Ry. Co. v. Allied
Materials Co., 1955, 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d
883. Vendor And Purchaser <^> 229(1)
Where railway's poles, guy wires and trolley
wires were located within boundary of land
deeded to present owner, and a prior deed in
owner's chain of title reserved part of land
awarded railway for right of way by decree of
district court, though such decree had not been
recorded until after intervening conveyances
which did not contain such reservation, present
owner, upon purchase of property, had constructive notice of railway's claims and rights in
land, and was not a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-15.
Salt Lake G & W Ry. Co v. Allied Materials

^

Co., 1955, 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 88*
dor And P u r c h a s e r ^ 229(1)

'

3.

Sufficiency of evidence
Evidence in quiet title action brought by pur
chasers of parcel of land including westerly
40-foot strip alleged by purchasers to be subject
to wrongful assertion by State of right adverse
to purchasers' fee title ownership due to prior
condemnation judgment was sufficient to support finding that description of property in recorded condemnation judgment did not give
purchasers, their grantors, or the public notice
that any of property in conveyance to purchasers was condemned. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-15.
Ash v. State, 1977, 572 P.2d. 1374.. Quieting
Title <©=» 44(4)

]\..\4i ft Substitution of bond for deposit paid into coi irt—Abandonr.< m u! .uiion by condemner Conditio! is of dismissal

In the event that no order is entered by the court permitting payment of said
deposit on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding
within thirty (30) days fo11 owing its deposit, the court may, o11 app 1 ication of the
condemning authority, permit the substitution of a bond in such amount and
with such sureties as shall be determined and approved by the court. Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, at any time prior to final
payment of compensation and damages awarded the defendant by the court or
jury, abandon the proceedings and cause the action to be dismissed without
prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal condemner first
compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse
him in full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by
condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemner, including attorneys fees.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1967, c. 220, § 1. .
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-34 -16.

'
ierenees

Eminent Domain <5=>197, 246.
Westlaw Key Number Searches:
148k246;

C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 357 to 365.
1 Kskl>7;

R e s e a t cl i R e f e r e n c e s
i• i mils

9A Am Jui-. PI. & Pr. Forms Eminent Domain
$ ;?: * Sunutorv References.
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REPORT OF CASES
DECIDED IN THE

'KJiiYlE C O l ' K I
;

ul< THE STAT..

UTAH

owners' attorney for services in connection

497 P.2d 620

with eminent domain proceeding which was

PROVO C I T Y C O R P O R A T I O N , P l a i n t i f f
a n (J Appellant,

dismissed at. request of condemnor, award

v.

without taking evidence as to reasonableness of fee was improper.

David L. CROPPER et a!., Defendants
and Respondents.

Remanded.

No. 12769.
M a y 2H, 1972.

1. Estoppel 3^68(2)

Supreme Court of Utah.

Condemnor should not be permitted to
represent to court that action was to be

The Fourth District Court, Utah Coun-

abandoned and dismissed for purpose of

ty, George E. Ballif, J., awarded appraiser

avoiding trial and thereafter

and attorney's fees to owners of property
involved in condemnation proceeding which

torney's fees.

The Supreme Court,

Tuckett, J., held that condemnor should not

U.C.A.1953, 78-34-16.

2. E m i n e n t D o m a i n

be permitted to represent to court that ac-

<$=>265(5)

Where parties could not agree as to

tion was to be abandoned and dismissed for
purpose of avoiding trial and

contend

of avoiding payment of expenses and at-

was dismissed at condemnor's request and
condemnor appealed.

to

that action was still pending for purpose

amount to be paid owners' attorney

for

thereafter

services in connection with eminent domain

to contend that action was still pending for

proceeding which was dismissed at request

purpose of avoiding" payment of expenses

of condemnor, award without taking evi-

and attorney's fees but that where parties

dence as to reasonableness of fee was im-

could not agree as to amount to be paid

proper.

28 Utah 2d—1

I

U.C.A.1953, 78-34-16.

28 UTAH
Glen J. Ellis, Frovo City 7 H , , fhovo,
for plaintiff

of $150 for the expense of appraisers and
$400 attorney's fees.

and appellant.

Gary D. Stott, Provo,
and respondents.

. REPORTS

for

defendants

that the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
In 1967, the State Legislature amended
Section 78-34-16, U.C.A.1953, which reads

TUCKETT, justice:
The plaintiff commenced these proceed-

in part as follows:
. • .

ings in eminent domain for the purpose of
acquiring property belonging to the defendants for a public use in establishing a public
park.

In due course the issues were joined

and a pretrial was had on June Id, 1971,
and the case set for trial on June 29.

On

or about June 24, the plaintiff through its
counsel advised the court and counsel for
the defendants that because of the high
value placed upon the land by the real estate appraisers, it was deemed advisable to
withdraw and dismiss the action.

Plaintiff

also informed the court that the defendants'
property was no longer needed for a public
use.

Pursuant to the representations of

the plaintiff, the case was stricken
the trial

from

conversations

were

had

between

court and counsel, the record of which is
not before this court.

However, it would

appear that the conferences were for the
purpose of discussing the amount of expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the
defendants in preparation for the trial of
the case.

.

Condemnor, whether a public

or private body, may, at any time prior
to final payment of compensation

and

damages awarded the defendant by the
court or jury, abandon the proceedings
and cause the action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided, however,
as a condition of dismissal

that

condemnor

tivst compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse
bun m full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee because of the. filing of the action by condemnor, including attorneys
fees.
It would appear that the provisions of the
amendment as set forth above were intend-

calendar.

After the case was stricken certain informal

It is from that order

As a result of the subsequent

hearing the court made and entered an or-

ed by the legislature

to deal with

the

practice of condemnors initiating proceedings to acquire private property for public
use and imposing upon

the owners

the

burdens of a trial or the preparation

for

a trial and then abandoning the proceedings, when it appeared that the price was
too high, or for some other reason the condemnor elected not to proceed further.
[1]

It is the plaintiff's contention h e r e

der dismissing the action without prejudice

that the action was not dismissed volun-

and awarding to the defendants the sum

tarily as provided for by Rule 41, I Jtah

HOLLEY v. SULLIVAN"
Cite as 28

Rules of < m l

Procedure, and

Utah 2.1 :$

497 P.2d 630

therefore

that the action is still pending and the court

Oarolji) HfH I FY, P l a i n t i f f and

was without authoiity to grant an award

\{v q j o i i i k n t ,

of

expenses

defendants.
the plaintiff

and attorney's

v.

fees to the

Samuel H. M i l L I V ^ N , Defendaiil
and Appellant.

We are of the opinion that
should not be pet mitt

t to

No. 12G90.

represent to the com t that this action was

Supreme Court of Utah.
Mav 22, 1972.

to be abandoned and dismissed for the purpose of avoiding a trial and thereafter to
contend that the action is still pending for

Action was brought by employee to re-

the pin pose of avoiding payment of expenses and attoi xj\ \s fees.

It is our view

that the statute was designed to correct a
problem of unfairness in casting a biudtn
upon the owners of private property in this
type of proceeding when the condemnor

cover wages and moving expenses.

The

Fourth District Couit, U t a h County, J o seph E. Nelson, J., found for employee and
employer appealed.

The Supreme

EUett, J., held that e\idence

elects not to go ahead with the acquisition,
and we ate of the opinion that the statute

chaiged

is contiolling here.

employee left employment and that where

The iecord would indicate that the

paid

all

wages

established

that

[2]

employer

Court,

due

employee within J I bonis

employer

discharged

disafter

employee, who

had

parties agreed as to the reasonableness of

been induced to move from 'Texas to U t a h

the appraiser's fees but there was a dispute

to

as to the reasonableness of the attorney's

employer to pay employee's moving

fees.

As this court has held, unless the

penses, employer could be held liable for

parties agree otherwise, the court is obliged

costs of employee moving back to T e x a s

\\<nl,

iindf i circumstances

obligating
ex-

to take evidence on the issue of the reason

but was not liable for additional costs in-

ableness of the attorney's fees and to make

volved in employee's moving to California.

findings thereon. 1 The record does not disclose that evidence was adduced on this

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded

issue, and we are obliged to lemaml lltr

1, Master and Sci van! *

case to the district court for a he.uing

U)\ I)

Evidence sustained t u a l court's

find-

on the amount of attorney's fees to be

ing that former employee had been fired.

awarded.

2. Labor Rotations <§^I473

No costs awarded.

C A L L I S T E R , C. J., and I I E N R I O D ,
E L L E T T and C R O C K E T T , TT, concur.

Under

statute authorizing

award

of

penalty of up !o oO da\ s' wages to em-

I. F.M.A. Financial (1orp. \. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, KM l\2d t>70.

